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APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SUGGESTIONS 
AS AN AMICUS CURIAE. 
And now comes Hany S. Mecartney, of Chicago, 
Illinois, a member of the bar of this court, and here-
with makes application to the court for leave to file 
in above cause the suggestions and brief data an-
nexed hereto as an amicus curiae. 
H ARRY S. MECARTNEY. 
Suggestions. 
We believe that the original idea of an arnicus 
curiae was a barrister at large who, from the van-
tage ground of an impartial observance, had noticed 
a grave error on the part of the court, either com-
mitted or imminent, and felt impelled to attempt to 
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save the court, the profession and the public from 
the threatened consequences. 
Of late years an amicus curiae is usually thought 
of as one interested in the pending issue only as 
counsel for another who, though not a party to the 
cause, is financially interested in the outcome ; and 
hence, such counsel is frequently thought of, primar-
ily at least, as an amicus, more of somebody's par-
ticular interests than of the court. 
If there be any class of cases in which the court 
could use to special advantage the services of an 
amicus curiae in the original sense of the term, it 
would seem to be the class to which the present case 
belongs. For, it is in these overwhelmingly im-
portant or turning-point cases-those that affect the 
com,mon life and the common interests of the people 
at large-that the judges most frequently divide 
in their opinions. Hence it is in this class of cases 
that erroneous rulings are more apt to result. 
This divergence in opinion can be largely ex-
plained or accounted for by the familiar truth that 
it is such life issues which put the heaviest strain 
upon our judgment, because they usually involve a 
breaking away from lifelong habits of thought and 
experience. 
But such a result is chiefly accounted for by the 
insufficient or narrow presentation to the court of 
the issues involved, even though frequently our legal 
giants appear to advance the pros and cons of the 
argument. The modern succes~ful lawyer is always 
"busy," always "rushed," and has not time for full-
est meditation. 
It so happens that in the Standard Oil case,_ 221 
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U. S. 1, presenting the very issue here involved, the 
Chief Justice formally and almost sadly commented 
upon the fact that in the briefs and arguments sub-
mitted by the very eminent counsel in the case there 
was '' no real point of agreement on any view of the 
act," or as to the la;w, or as to the facts. And it 
would Seem that this formal deliverance of the court 
is alone and of itself a strong ''item'' to prove the 
claim of the usefulness of "neutral" counsel in this 
class of cases. 
So, too, while the position of the Government's 
counsel is supposedly at least technically "neutral" 
in all these cases, nevertheless such counsel are 
usually heavily overburdened with exacting and var-
ied duties. It is, too, an open secret that when a 
public issue becomes acute and affects the en-
tire nation at large, it naturally becomes a fea-
ture of political debate and of general discussion, 
and gradually furnishes, too, a prominent ''plank'' 
in political campaigns. It must of necessity follow 
that thoughtlessly and unconsciously the '' adminis-
tration' '-and hence its counsel-becomes a sort of 
champion .or sponsor for one or the other side of the 
question; and this may occasionally tend to narrow 
its presentation. It is, in fact, lamentably true that 
upon the day after the publication of the Northern 
Securities' decision the press widely published a 
conference at the White House in which the then 
President expressed his great gratification over the 
"victory" which the administration had just "won" 
-a victory which, by the way, was seemingly re-
nounced by him in later years. 
All this would seem to prove that in this class of 
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cases there is a natural niche of usefulness to fill by 
the services of a neutral "amicus." 
We also submit that, in cases like the preseut,-
marking as they do crises in industrial progress, and 
calling in fact for an outlining of new national indus-
trial policies-the nece ity of the early settlement of 
such issues, or at least prompt relief from the con-
crete crisis, should be more fully recognized even in 
the judicial forum than is usual. It in fact behooves 
the counsel engaged to consider and point the '' way 
out" of the difficulties. 
As our eminent Philadelphia brother, Mr. John-
son, lately said upon his argument in the Adamson 
Law case: '' The real issues here should be set-
tled; they should be settled now; but let us settle 
them in a statesmanlike way." 
And we have little doubt that if a few men of the 
marvelous ability and attainments of our eminent 
brother had the time to contribute their statesman-
ship, had the time to tender their fullest and most 
independent efforts and suggestions towards accom-
plishing the settlement of the public issues involved 
in these grave cases in which they should be re-
tained from time to time, the divisions in this 
court in such cases would be heavily reduced from 
the prevailing ratio-and error in the court's judg-• 
ments extremely rare; and there would therefore ob-
viously be a minimum of need for ''neutral'' counsel 
and rare occasions indeed for the tender of their 
services. 
In the Northern Securities case, however, this 
same eminent brother tendered but little to this end 
-although his brief, as usual, was a marvel of clear 
ness in demonstrating the logic of the issues. 
The issue of '' competition or co-operation'' was 
not raised, and the latter word is almost if not en-
tirely omitted from the briefs. The vision of the 
epoch in this epoch-marking case was not revealed. 
Nor did the company or combination in defending 
the legality of its existence admit its economic pow-
er, and then tender in argument its a.menability to 
regulation as a sufficient antidote to public fear of 
the power, etc. It apparently did not want to b& 
regulated. 
The writer herewith submits data upon two main 
features-controlling features-of the present case 
The first claim was argued of course in the 
Northern Securities case-for it was the main point 
involved. It was overruled or denied in a ":five to 
four'' decision. No petition for rehearing was :filed. 
In the Standard Oil case this same point was argued, 
but indirectly, the opinion itself grouping the com-
pany's argument under two heads only: First, lack 
of jurisdiction in Congress, and, second, lack of '' due 
process" of law, etc. And no appeal was made to 
the court to recall the : 'Securities'' ruling. It wa1::1 
simply sought to escape it-to '' get around'' it. 
The privilege to openly attack this same ruling is 
again waived in the briefs :filed in the present case; 
and it has been waived also in the oral arguments. 
We believe, however, that the suggestions tendered 
below in criticism of the Securities ruling (written 
in 1904-5 and annexed separately), are chiefly new, 
and that if the arguments below be permitted to be 
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filed, they will also constitute the first open attack 
upon the Standard Oil decision. 
The second claim-affecting the relief to be 
granted-is seemingly absolutely new ground, and 
has not been passed upon in any way, shape or form, 
nor submitted to the court, in the prior "trust" 
cases. 
As some color or warrant for disturbing the 
court or justices in this case, and attempting to 
''break into'' the ordinary curriculum, etc., the 
writer tenders the following: 
1. That he is absolutely neutral as to the issue. 
No paid retainer in any similar case has ever been 
received by him down to date, and he has no promise 
or hope of any, direct or indirect. He submits the 
suggestions herewith "without favor or hope of re-
ward,'' except for the possible satisfaction of having 
aided-be it never so humbly-the permanent settle-
ment of a question which has long vexed our coun-
try and its judicial systems, and borne· heavily upon 
its industrial welfare. 
2. That, including an exhaustive criticism or 
treatise of th~ Northern Securities opinion (128 pp.) 
completed in March, 1905, he has devoted about or 
over. eight months of professional labor to writing 
upon this ''Trust'' issue. 
3. That from time to time as the same was pre-
pared, he bas placed his data before the counsel for 
the Government and counsel for the corporations, 
defendants in these several ''Trust'' causes. 
The effort here made, therefore, bas not been 
born of impulse; and we believe that a due reluc-
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tance to unnecessarily or prematurely bother the 
court of the justices, has been observed. 
We therefoi'e submit our feeble effort to prompt 
the court to reconsider this great national issue, and 
towards convincing it of the following: 
1st. That there is no existing "law of competi-
tion" which if left alone automatically works for 
good, or even for an increase of trade-any more 
than the existing '' law of competition'' between the 
"warring members" of our human nature auto-
matically results in yielding to the temptation 
and never in triumphing over it. No such con-
cept therefore can be found in or "construed into" 
the Sherman Act. 
2d. That there is no point in the growth or 
process of the combination of trade plants at which 
the "power to ·control prices" passes to the 
"Trust" or combination-as in the instance of ob-
taining the control of a corporation by the acquire-
ment of a majority of its stock. For every trade 
plant has some power to control, i. e., to influence 
prices. And this influence in turn fluctuates from 
day to day, as market conditions vary, and is wide-
ly variant in different articles or products. 
In other words there is no point in such process of 
combination or growth at which one becomes a 
criminal and subject to fine and imprisonment. 
Certainly at least such a point cannot (humanly 
at least) be ascertained-unless fl.xed in advance 
by positive enactment. 
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That is to say : 
The whole attempt of the court in these 
"trust" cases to justify a decree upon the 
basis of a "power to control prices" is an at-
tempt to make a constant out of a variable. 
3d. That this great lodestone of error in the sev~ 
eral rulings of recent years should b~ formally rec-
ognized, and the Northern Securities decision ( as 
explained by the Standard Oil ruling) be squarely 
and openly overruled. (Seemingly no one has 
yet tried to get it overruled.) 
4th. That while a great industrial combination 
which has grown great and powerful by evil and 
oppressive trade practices may deserve dissolu-
tion, and while the court unquestionably has power 
to decree its dissolution-nevertheless public 
policy does not require or demand the entry of such 
dissolution decrees. But on the contrary, such act-
ual dissolution would be a great public calamity; 
while a partial dissolution such as has been entered 
in the Standard Oil and other late cases produces 
little or no effect-and hence little or no good. ( p-
parently, it simply requires the keeping of more 
books.) 
5th. The warrant for the incorporation of great 
industrial corporations is the "public value" or 
benefit inherent in their opportunities, their func-
tions-their size. The decree in such cases, there-
fore, should not destroy this inherent public value, 
but should, so far as possible, cause the offending 
entity to restore property unjustly taken, to 
right financial wrongs committed, and to satis-
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fy damages inflicted-both as to private parties 
affected and as to the public and to the extent that 
it is possible so to do. 
6th. If its wrongs have been of such long stand-
ing and conditions have so changed that relief can-
not be given-it cannot be helped-cert?inly not by 
a dissolution decree. The court is not to blame. 
7th. That relief from oppressive combinations 
is to be had (1) by means of laws penalizing specific 
trade wrongs, or acts, or practices (2) by actual 
regulation of their trade practices through super-
visory bodies, etc., and (3) by decrees of courts that 
will require satisfaction of wrongs committed. 
Since the briefs in this case have just lately been 
filed, and the oral arguments just :finished, we sug-
gest that this application is made in ample time, be-
cause submitted in practically the earliest time at 
which any colorable necessity therefor has occurred. 
We submit, then, that the present case, for reasons 
above and below given, presents a case of '' peculiar 
circumstances,'' in which this court should receive 
properly tendered efforts of an amicus curiae. 
For it has full discretion so to do. (First North-
ern Securities case, 191 U. S. 555.) 
In conclusion, a word of '' personal privilege,'' 
as the parliamentarians say . 
.lfor over a third of a century it has been my priv-
ilege to observe with many others, and with deepest 
professional concern the gradually increasing havoc 
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in American judicial rulings that our ultra-cheap 
system of jurisprudence has been making. For a 
number of years the court dockets at the large in-
dustrial centers of the country have been clogged up 
to an alarming degree, and '' justice freely and with-
out delay" has become in some places and in very 
fact almost a byword or mockery. Six, eight and 
ten-year lawsuits are a co111,mon thing! 
Cheap ''costs'' have gradually led to cheap liti-
gation, and this to "hasty " briefs and hasty deci-
sions given under high pressure. The result of this 
nation-wide condition, has of necessity been to throw 
a great volume of cases upon this court, thus rob-
bing it of time for fullest meditation upon each case 
presented-which it ought to have and which in 
earlier and simpler times it actually had. 
For many years the writer with others has been 
. appealing to local, State, and National Bar Associa-
tions to take cognizance of this general court situa-
tion and arm for a steady campaign of relief. 
The justices of this court have been seemingly 
straining every nerve for many years to catch up 
more closely with its docket, in order to give more 
prompt relief. But it is beyond human capacity. It 
thus has felt called upon to grant practically no re-
hearings; and this means and inevitably means prac-
tically never to correct an error in the case in which 
made. 
This is a sad condition of affairs-and one for 
which the court is not responsible and of itself can-
not cure. But the situation calls loudly for relief. 
(The writer hopes to continue to contribute his mite 
to this end.) 
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But in the meantime, such a situation does not jus-
tify the assumption-apparently indulged in here-
tofore by the counsel engaged in these "trust" cases 
-that the court, even though it rnay err, and ma;y 
perceive its error, will not formally recall its rul-
ing upon an issue of national import. 
This is indeed a peculiar and false respect for the 
court as such-to assume that it will not confess 
error under any circumstances. For respect for the 
court must go hand in hand with concern for its wel-
fare and for the general accuracy of its decisions. 
This general situation is only referred to here, as 
a just explanation, at least in part, of a very strange 
and very grievous court attitude in respect to this 
national ''Trust'' issue; and as helping to place 
primary responsibility therefor where it belongs, 
viz. : upon the bar. 
We respectfully submit that in the Northern Se-
curities case we reached the '' parting of the ways,'' 
and were led into the wrong road and took a stride 
in the direction of error. We must now retrace 
our steps and take the other road. 
For, '' as sure as is the law by which the millstone 
sinks in the ocean,'' so sure is it that you can not 
make a constant out of a variable. And it also 
ought to be just that sure that in America men ought 
not to be convicted of a crime, when there is no 
means of humanly or consciously knowing when they 
became guilty of one. 
Respectfully submitted, 
lliRRY S. MECARTNEY. 
137 So. La Salle Street, 
Chicago, March 20, 1917. 
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II. 
AN OUTLINE "BRIEF OF THE ARGUMENT." 
Preliminary. 
In the fall of 1903, some time after the opm10n 
in the Minnesota t J. S. Circuit Court had been de-
livered in the ''Northern ecurities'' case, the :writer 
turned aside from ordinary professional labors to 
solve for himself the then much mooted question of 
the legality or ille_gality of ''trusts,'' etc. The issue 
was recognized as one that was to come into every· 
lawyer's professional life in time; and so he pre-
f erred to study the matter at first hand and to ap-
proach the issue as an "absolute neutral," and to 
work out his convictions before a paid retainer might 
possibly warp or handicap him in its solution. 
(Incidentally: No paid retainer in a similar case 
has ever been received by him down to date.) 
The conclusion reached, after a study of the briefs 
and of the question at large, was that the ruling of 
the court, finding that the ''combination'' was illegal, 
was erroneous. 
After the decision of this court, in March, 1904, 
had been rendered, affirming the judgment of the 
Circuit Court (193 U. S. 197), he was prompted to 
enlarge upon his prior work, and was tempted to at-
tack what seemed to him the fallacies in Mr. Justice 
Harlan's majority opinion. 
The result was an elaborate if not fairly exhaust-
ive document of 128 pages of print. 
Copies of this docµment (bound in black seal) were 
sent to the various justices of this court; as well as 
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to various judges and lawyers within a limited 
"reading circle" of the writer. 
After analyzing the ruling of the majority opinion 
and attempting to show its cardinal fallacy of petitio 
principii as we saw it, we sought to account for the 
mistake thus made ( outside of the long-standing 
handicap of an abnormal ''docket'' burden upon the 
court), as follows : 
1st. The fact that large and powerful combina-
tions had grown up in our country and caught us 
with no sufficient regulatory equipment on hand, 
and hence that the fear of the evil that could be done 
or the oppression that could be inflicted by such com-
binations, seemingly led the court to go too far in its 
laudable desire to protect the public therefrom. 
2d. The fact that it was not pointed out by the 
coun el in the case with any insistence, and was ac-
companied with no appeal that the then existing and 
threatening condition called for immediate and legal 
regulation of such large combines or monopolies; and 
that hence "the way for relief" was not argued, 
and not even definitely suggested in the briefs in the 
cause. 
3rd. It was then predicted that as surely as the 
ruling in the Northern Securities case was attempted 
to be applied to large corporations generally which 
were similarly structured or formulated, disastrous 
:financial results would follow. 
The excuse for sending copies of this document 
to the then justices of this court was the fact that if 
the c~mrt had erred, it was, as usual, primarily the 
fault of a too narrow presentation of the "ultimate'_' 
issues, and that it then became a duty of the coun-
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sel in the cause to petition for a rehearing-which 
had not been done in that case. And suggestion was 
made that, no matter how few rehearings had been 
granted by this court in the overwhelmingly heavy 
docket which had oppressed it for many years, wher-
ever a "five-to-four" opinion or division was in evi-
dence in respect to a great public issue, it was urgent 
that a rehearing of the question involved should be 
had, and hence petitioned for. 
Considering, therefore, the ominous nature of the 
ruling, the overwhelming confusion and public loss 
that was apt to follow from it, the writer felt that 
as an "officer of the court" it was not inappropriate 
to lodge with the justices a very earnest appeal that 
the question in some form be reconsidered, and this, 
as said above, was done, and the result was la-
beled "The 'Merger' case; A Petition for a Rehear-
ing; An Appeal from the Younger Generation,'' etc. 
(The document so labeled here and annexed hereto 
consists of Part I of this so-called treatise, a few 
pages of Part II and the ''Vision'' and '' Retro-
spect" at the end.) 
\ Several years later, and in July, 1907, the writer 
felt called upon-in view of the unsettled public and 
"market" feeling about this issue-to make certain 
suggestions to the American Bar Association (then 
in prospect of having its annual meeting at Port-
land, Maine), to the effect that a cause of such wide-
reaching importance was enough to prompt the ef-
forts of one of its able committees to present '' a 
case stated" involving this same "trust" issue to 
the U. S. Supreme Court, and that it (being a neu-
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tral body) should formally appeal for a re-consider-
ation of that issue before the confusion became 
greater. ( Copies of the appeal were sent in ad-
vance of the meeting to each of the 3,000 members.) 
In that document the writer predicted again that 
if and when the Northern Securities doctrine should 
be sought to be applied to corporations or combines 
generally, "widespread disaster would result." 
The motion for the Association to take this action 
was lost. 
It was only a eouple of months after this docu-
ment had been prepared and distributed that the Gov-
ernment filed its information against the Tobacco 
Company (it had sued the Standard Oil Company 
some months before), and the government gave out 
to the press a list of several dozen of the largest in-
dustrial companies in the country which it had slated 
for attack along the same lines. 
And it so happened that immediately afterwards 
the panic of October, 1907, occurred. 
A year after this (1908) the writer prepared a doc-
ument reciting briefly the then recent ''Trust'' his-
tory up to date, and sug~sting to the railroad coun-
sel of the chief systems of the country (some 200 of 
them were sent copies) that the roads or other large 
combinations petition anew in some form for a re-
consideration of the ''Trust'' issue in this court, and 
seek to get the "Northern Securities" decision 
overruled. Nothing came of this effort. 
Some four years later the Standard Oil and To-
bacco cases were decided, explaining or modifying 
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the Northern Securities holding with a '' rule of 
reason," but leaving the main basis of the prior rul-
ing intact-and unatta.cked. 
Over two years ago the writer was furnished with 
full copies of the briefs in this so-called ''Steel'' 
case, then pending in the District Court of New Jer-
sey, and about the same time received a copy of the 
briefs in the present Harvester case, in which re-
argument has been lately had in this court. 
He then prepared another brief document, bearing 
upon the merits of question but which was chiefly an 
attack upon the mode of relief which had been adopted 
in these cases. He dwelt at large upon the fatuity 
of entering these ''dissolution'' decrees in the mat-
ter of these big, valuable entities. He furnished 
eopies of his "brief" to Judge Gary, of the Steel 
Company, and to Judo-e Dickinson, the Government's 
special counsel in the '' Steel case.'' 
We now come to the form in which these cases 
(''Harvester'' and ''Steel'' cases) have been pre-
sented for argument in this court. We observe that 
apparently no earnest effort has been made by the 
corporations attacked to persuade this court (1), 
that its ruling in the Northern Securities case, as 
somewhat modified by its opinion in the Standard 
Oil case, is wrong. Nor (2), has any effort been 
made on the part of counsel for such companies to 
convince the court that even if these combinations 
have transgressed the Sherman law, said law did ,n,ot • 
and could not require either their absolute or partial 
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dissolution. That the law could not require the court 
to needlessly cause great and abnormal public loss, 
etc. 
Therefore, having written and delved in a thor-
ouo-hly neutral spirit in this issue for some thirteen 
years or more with original convictions unshaken; 
seeing the mischief grow; witnessing these vast 
records coming to · this court, any one of which is 
enough to wreck a normal human mind in attempts 
to master it; seeing able arguments of able men de-
livered upon an ever shifting· and elusive base,-it 
seems to us that it is about time for some one to 
raise a hand in protest. For the upheaval must 
come some time and the longer delayed, the greater. 
And having from time to time sent copies of the for-
mer data, prepared after many months of labor in 
the aggregate, to counsel and parties on both sides 
of these cases, we feel called upon, personally and 
formally and openly and directly, to suggest to this 
court the propriety of considering or reconsidering 
both of these dominant issues. 
If unprejudiced service, i. e., "neutral" service, 
and hard and persistent work done without any ex-
pectation of financi l reward, is as acceptable to this 
court as that which is usually done for a paid re-
tainer, or as that frequently performed as 
an amicus curiae by counsel for a ,party financial-
ly interested in the issue, we then are constrained 
to point to the great labor given and the great ex-
pense incurred by the writer on this big issue as a 
warrant for disturbing this court with an application 
to file the briefs or suggestions submitted herewith. 
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While it probably is not ncessary so to . do we 
add an affidavit as to our personal non-interest, etc., 
in the subject. 
STATE OF ILLINOIS, l 
CouNTY OF CooK. 5 ss. 
HARRY S. MECARTNEY being duly sworn, deposes 
and says that he has been _engaged in the practice 
of law for over thirty-three years in Chicago; that 
he has been a member of the bar of the United States 
Supreme Court for over fifteen years. 
Affiant further states that the statements above 
made under the heading "Preliminary" substantial-
ly show the amount of time which affiant has spent 
in various professional brief work and treatises 
upon the subject ref erred to-namely, upon the ques-
tion of the legality or illegality of combinations or 
so-called trusts in trade; that the time spent in and 
about said work, together with that spent in prepar-
ing for the application above and preparing the data 
and brief work submitted herewith, has amounted 
to about or above eight months. 
Affiant further says that he has never been paid 
or promised any retainer or law fees for the work 
which has been thus done, nor for attempting to 
appear in the present case, nor for preparing the 
brief work or suggestions herewith submitted, nor 
has he any expectation of any financial reward, di-
rect or indirect, from the work which he has done 
upon this issue, or in preparing the matter herewith 
submitted. 
Affiant further says that the briefs in the said 
cause of United States v. United States Steel Car-
19 ' 
po ration, were only filed a few days before the ar-
gument, and that he did not and does not deem that 
any application to the court of the kind here made, 
• would have been appropriate until after the regular 
briefs and arguments had been filed and made, for 
not until then could it have been determined whether 
the points or suggestions herewith tendered had been 
covered by the regular counsel. 
That affiant has worked continually since the briefs 
in the cause were filed, in preparing the data here-
with submitted and the same is submitted at the 
earliest hour physically possible so to do. 
Further affiant sayeth not. 
HARBY s. MECABTNEY. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 21st day 
of March, A. D. 19.1.7. 
(Seal) 
Ev ANGELINE STEWART' 




1. ''Combination'' is simply ''co-operation.'' 
That there is no "l(l,(UJ of competition," existing by 
statute, existing in phy ics, or existing in human 
nature, which law, if left alone automatically works 
for good or even works for an increase of trade, 
and which is violated by a statute passed in general 
form prohibiting evil or wrong in trade, whether by 
way of ''restraint'' or of inhibiting ''monopoly'' in 
whole or "in part." 
2. The formal edict of this court to the contrary 
is error, and it should now be formally recalled, and 
the Northern Securities decision, as well as the chief 
ruling in the Standard Oil decision, should be square-
ly and openly overruled. 
3. There is even no definite trade concept of 
"competition" except that of independence, i. e., of 
independent concerns engaged in certain lines of 
trade. 
4. If Congress meant by the Sherman Act to re-
strain all independent concerns engaged in trade 
from joining their means or resources in trade, or 
making any coalition for trade purposes, it could 
have plainly and easily said so-but it is not hard 
to imagine what this court would have done with. 
such a law. 
5. Although combinations in trade, or large c·or-
porations engaged therein, have, or may have, 
some power to oppress, it should be recognized that 
relief from the threatened power of such combina-
21 
tions must be had through their regulation, through 
penal laws directed at their acts of oppression, etc., 
and by dec1·ees causing restitution of property and 
satisfaction of damages, etc. 
6. The proposition that rnere size in an industrial 
unit or organization is per se illegal is absolutely 
unsound and fallacious. 
If mere size in any particular trade industry be 
ominous, it can only become illegal when a limit to 
size is drawn in advance by some legislative edict. 
7. A so-called ".trust" which has monopolized 
a part-even a very large part-of a particular class 
of trade or commerce of the country, can only be 
attacked and dissolved when it 
a, actually has used unfair and oppressive 
methods to attain its size or gain its position of 
dominance in the trade; or b, where its declared 
objects are unfair, oppressive, or illegal; or c, 
where it is proven or admits that it intends to 
commit such evils or wrongs. 
8. The fundamental law of trade and the f 1tnda-
mental encouragement to trade is to increase trade 
by all possible legal and fair rr;i.eans. And when the 
size of the trade factor-whether in corporate or 
partnership or individual form-becomes large 
enough to involve or possess the power to oppress, 
it then challenges public regulation,-but not destruc-
tion. 
9. If these be economic truths, they a.re presum-
ably known to the public at large, and presumably 
were so known at the time the Sherman Act was 
passed. And the court in construing the Sherman 
Act ( and its "general language") had no call and 
no right to attribute an intention to Congress to run 
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counter to such truths and to our whole industrial 
system and policy. 
Nor had it any call or right to subst~tute an inten-
tion to preserve what it has been pleased to call 
"reasonable competition," or, as the Government 
counsel says, "our competitive system"-an ambu-
latory, undefined, and indefinite concept. 
10. What would be thought of a law which pro-
scribed not '' restraint of trade,'' not ''monopolistic'' 
practices but-'' any coalition of trading concerns, 
which militated against the 'yreservation of our 
competitive system' "I 
And of an attempt to convict traders of a crime 
upon the basis of such language! 
· 11. And to find men guilty of a crime or "con-
spiracy" to do an act which is not per se a fraudu-
lent or unfair trade act ( as, for instance, an instan-
taneous or sudden and oppressive or fraudulent 
raising of prices), but which "unreasonably re-
stricts,'' not trade,-but competition--is to convict 
them of transgressing or going beyond an imaginary 
line in growth. That is, to convict them for grow. 
ing to a conspiracy-a point not defined in advance 
and hence a point which no human agency can define. 
So that the only way to absolutely avoid becoming 
a conspirator would be to refuse to grow at all. 
Legislation, it is true, can draw a point or line at a 
definite size, i. e., definite amount of capital, or defi-
nite limits of territary or of time, or of amount of 
bitsiness, etc., etc. 
Admittedly, Congress has not done this. 
12. Nor is any aid given to this effort by resorting 
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to the common law (as this court attempted to do in 
the Standard Oil case )-except to apply the common 
law of "restraint of trade" practices, or monopoly 
practices, i. e., "forestalling" or "engrossing" the 
market, i. e., sudden and temporary and acute acts, 
accompanied with an actual and definitely large 
increase in prices, or accompanied with avowed or 
admitted or undenied intent to enhance prices, etc. 
And such offenses usually affected the necessaries of 
life in an age when there usually were scant supplies 
of these and rarely indeed a surplus. 
13. Even these acts at common law were not pre-
tended to be covered by general principles, but by 
specific legislation; and even such statutes were :final-
ly repealed. As this court says in the Oil case, '' in 
the changing conditions of society'' and of '' eco-
nomic conceptions,'' it was :finally recognized that 
frequently the result of engrossing, i. e.,. buying in 
large quantities, etc., were not harmful but "tended 
to fructify and develop trade." (P. 55.) 
Is it not as easy for the court to find that in 1890 
there existed '' economic conceptions'' in favor of 
the idea that co-operation of large units is apt to -lower prices to the public and to increase trade, etc.1 
To find that "co-operation" in the present condi-
tions of society is as well recognized as cut-throat 
competition? 
14. .Apparently no case has been cited, or can be, 
in ·which any one was convicted at common law un-
der such specific statutes {which actually furnished 
their own standard, viz., sudden and acute acts of 
oppression, etc.), and where such acts were held to 
make one guilty when they had actually been fol-
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lowed and perhaps followed for months and years 
with a reduction-instead of an enhancement-in 
prices. 
Evidently no authority at common law has been 
cited where it was held that the power to raise prices 
to any degree was itself and in principle the actual 
raising of prices. 
15. '' Restraint of trade,'' i. e., fraudulent re-
straint of trade, and "monopolistic practices," is a 
definite concept and sufficient to fix guilt. But a 
· fraudulent growth, whether accomplished by grad-
ual increase by the purchase of plants or by asso-
ciation of partnerships or corporations-in a juris-
diction where specific statittes al,low such growth-
cannot be conceived for a moment. There is no given 
point in growth which can rnark the line between in-
nocence and conspiracy. 
There is no common law ruling that joining con 
cerns in trade constitutes "engrossing" or a, 
''monopolistic'' act.'' 
16. The error in the Standard Oil decision ( tho 
fullest exposition of the view of the court on the sub -
ject), consisted chiefly in this : 
(a) Admitting that the Sherman Act-providing 
against a conspiracy, i. e., against a crime-waf', 
drafted "in general language"; admitting that thi~ 
criminal statute was so vague that "it required that. 
some stamdard should be resorted to," i. e., sitpplied 
by the court in construction, etc.,-the court supplied 
the wrong standard; 
(b) The court attempted to supply '' the stand • 
ard of reason" which had been "applied at the com 
mon law.'' But instead of defining that standard as 
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affecting unreasonable or fraudulent '' enhancement 
of prices" or other fraudulent and specific acts, or 
"monopolistic practices," it passed by the only defi-
nite and valid standard supplied by the common law, 
and was led to seize upon a supposed line between 
''reasonable'' and '' unreasonable restraint of com-
petition." 
( c) It failed then to test out th.e only '' competi- . 
tion'' concept produced by the c.ommon law, name-
ly: an unlimited restriction of one's right to engage 
in a trade by making a special contract, therefor. 
And in such instance the "reasonabhmess" or "un-
reasonableness'' of any proposed limitation in such 
a contract was tested by a definite territory, a definite 
period of time, or a definite amount of business, etc., 
etc. 
The Sherman Act furnishes none of these limits in 
its supposed protection of ''competition. '' 
17. The formation of this big combine, no matter 
how big it was, was simply a step in the growth of 
the industry. It was not any greater in proportion 
than perhaps thirty or forty ''steps'' similar or sub-
stantially similar, taken amongst the antecedents of 
the very subsidiary corporations. And it apparent-
ly has not been claimed by the government that the 
stockholders in the holding company have made any 
greater profit, or at least any greater rate of profit, 
by reason of the step thus taken than the stockhold-
ers of the subsidiary companies had made years be-
fore in taking advantage of the same or identical 
strictly legal invitation of their respective states to 
join plants or consolidate corporations for the pitr-
pose of increasing their trade. 
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It is no remarkable or unique thing for the assets 
of a corporation to increase in a period of over 16 
years in the proportion of 3 to 1-especially in a fast 
developing industry. 
18. In other words, if Congress desired to make 
it criminal for a corporate industry to grow, either 
by purchase of plants or by consolidation of com-
panies and industries, it should have drawn the line 
at a certain amount of capital-as in the instance of 
the present Missouri statute-or at a certain amount 
of business or trade carried on (as ascertained by 
some furnished tests or reports to be made), etc., 
etc., or by territory to be covered-and too, per-
haps specifically define the trade, the article, or kind 
of products, etc., etc. 
19. The mere incident of a "holding company" is 
unconsciously seized upon to bolster up the concept 
of unfair or fraudulent growth, etc. But if such plan 
is a legal plan and legally chartered by one of the 
states, one cannot find guilt in this device. It could, 
it is true, furnish some evidence of intent connected 
with a fraudulent act or practice. But it, being le-
gal, cannot help out the variable and shifting ele-
ment of size or growth, to the extent of fixing guilt. 
20. But more than this: Why is not the corporate 
device of a "holding" company a logical and legiti-
mate one for the efficient and economical direction 
of a mammoth industry with various and varied 
plants in many states T 
Were our country a single state, one large cor-
poration with plant or territorial "departments" 
might be as satisfactory to deal with from the stand-
point of a single government or a single regulatory 
body created by it. 
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But in a government of separate states, with a 
national government superimposed upon them, the 
situation is different. 
In fact, ea.ch state as is well known prefers to 
--deal with a large local industry through a corpora-
tion of its own creation. And sometimes the local 
restrictions or regulations are so many or complex 
as to suggest or compel local incorporation in the 
interest of simplicity and directness. 
21. Again: Independently of this dual govern-
ment feature, the holding company is probably the 
best if not the only satisfactory device for an eco-
nomic control over the associated plants and indus-
tries and their output, in the way of territorial sup-
ply of trade and the distribution of orders, etc., to 
the best advantage of all concerned-and hence, it 
is, certainly it may be, the best device to develop 
the largest increase of trade. 
The holding company may involve increased pow-
er-but hand in hand ·with this goes power to in--
crea-se trade. 
22. The ominousness of a holding company is a 
factor in economic power-and hence, it is a factor 
of economic pitblic advantage. 
In other words, the bigger the economic giant and 
the more power he has, the more does he challenge 
regulation. But if we destroy "the goose that lays 
the golden egg"-we simply lose the egg. 
23. The holding company feature cannot be seized 
upon to support the idea that it '' unduly restricts 
competition" as an individual did at common law 
when he placed by contract an . unlimited restraint 
upon his right to work or do business. 
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24. Nor does the word "perpetual" (used in 
Standard Oil decision .... ) , add anything to the sit-
uation. The holding company is no more "perpet-
ual" than its charter; and that charter no more per-
petual than others. 
25. Of convincing significance is the fact, that in 
Canada, England, France and Germany, the econo-
mic value in size itself, in certain lines of industry 
has long been recognized, and size has been encour-
aged-but at the same time actively regitlated. How 
would Germany have so vastly increased her for-
eign trade in iron and steel in the last 20 years had 
she had only small plants as formerly-in other 
words, had she ' ' preserved'' at all hazards her 
" competit,ive system?" For the attorney general 
tells us that ours must be so preserved, and that this 
was the object of Congress in passing the Sherman 
Act. And all the headings in his brief hover around 
or are based upon this one idea. 
26. If the "holding" company is peculiar to our 
country, and if there be anything ungainly, or awk-
ward, or unnecessarily cumbersome in this feature 
of large industrial development and power-it arises 
from our dual system of government-national and 
state, and this gives it its uses or its warrant of 
necessity. 
27. The plea made in our "Northern Securities" 
or "merger" treatise or criticism to the effect that 
the safety valve of relief from the threatened power 
of large industrial combinations lies in active super-
vision and regulation, and the effectiveness and suffi-
ciency thereof has been borne out by the legislation 
passed since, viz : In the broadened powers of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission and its practical 
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working for nearly or quite 10 years past, and by 
the establishment of the Federal Trade Commission. 
The destructive decrees-i. e., theoretically de-
structive at least-such as have been entered in the 
late ''Trust'' cases are not needed now to deter men 
from doing the unreasonable-even if they ever did 
have any substantial effect so to do. The scepter of 
"regulation" and "restraint" against oppressive 
practices is now ever above them and in plain sight. 
2 . In conclusion: 
(1) We cannot make a constant out of a variable. 
( 2) The only "restraint of trade" which this 
statute (Sec. 1) furnishes as a constant, is restraint 
of trade by fraudulent acts or practices-as, for 
instance, an undue or fraudulent raising of prices to 
the consuming public. This can be so great and sud-
den as to be a guilty act. 
(3) Tbe only constOJnt furnished by the prohibi-
tion against '' monopolizing the whole or any part 
of" the trade in any article of trade (Sec. 7) is a 
prohibition of "monopolistic practices, such as en-
hancement of prices"-which this court in the Stand-
ard Oil opinion calls one of the things spoken of 
'' as monopoly'' itself. 
( 4) If in interpreting the statute we bold it to 
mean anything more than these two different con-
cepts, we are bound to hold it to be a wholesale pro-
hibition against all persons or corporations engaged 
in trade from associating or combining their plants 
even for business, i. e., trade purposes. 
( 5) A holding company is a legal entity and can 
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not furnish a test nor help to draw a line to help out 
this general statute. It is not interdicted, or con-
demned. 
( 6) The concept of a "control of prices" will 
not help. In many lines of trade a concern which 
does 30 per cent. or 40 per cent. of the entire trade, 
could produce more e:ffec upon the market than one 
in another line doing 80 per cent. of the business in 
its general line. 
(II.) 
The Relief. 
Our second main proposition is this : 
29. That where such combination or corporation 
has actually oppressed the public, or its competitors, 
by unfair trade methods or practices in trade, and 
has perhaps grown to its position of trade power 
largely as the result of such evil practices, and 
while 
(1.) Such facts of evil growth may be pre-
sumptive evidence of an intent to further op-
press ( as held in the Standard Oil case) ; and 
while 
(2.) Such combination may deserve dissolu-
tion; and while 
(3.) The court has power to dissolve such a 
quasi monopoly, yet 
( 4.) There being an inherent public value in 
the combination itself-its entity, its func-
tions, its very size-
A proper and wholesome decree in such case do es 
not involve a dissolution of the combine, and the de-
struction of this public value. But such decree 
should require the offending "trust" to restore to 
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private parties wronged the property or money 
wrongfully taken from them, or to satisfy the dam-
ages committed, so far as it is possible to do so. 
And as to public wrongs the decree should require 
that the property of the offending trust be turned 
out or over to public authority to satisfy any statu-
tory fines or other public claims. And where such 
public loss is reasonably certain or can be estimated 
in amount with reasonable approximation, the de-
cree should require the payment of such amount into 
the public treasury-the cy pres representative of 
the public :finances, etc.-in satisfaction of such dam-
ages or loss. 
30. If it be said t~at such a proceeding would be 
l~vying fines in equity, etc., it is answered, Not so: 
That equity of necessity must have full jurisdiction 
in cases of such nature to require wrongs to be satis-
fied; and that no company or incorporated enter-
prise which has forfeited its right to live and has by 
its practices formally invited its dissolution, can 
complain of the court's conditioning its continued 
existence upon such terms or any other reasonable 
terms-as an alternative to the exercise of its power 
to dissolve, i. e., destroy. 
31. If the concern shall have grown so big and its 
industrial ramifications shall have become so wide 
and extensive, and if its tentacles have gradually 
reached so deep into the body politic, and the con-
cern has become so great that the dissolution thereof 
would cause immense and staggering public incon-
venience, confusion and loss ( as this court intimated 
was the case with the Standard Oil Company), that is 
the greater reason why the court should require sat-
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is/action of wrongs,. public and private, for past mis-
deeds, rather than decree such dissolution. 
32. If, on the other hand, "the trust" or entity, 
attacked should defy the decree and voluntarily re-
sign its functions rather than submit to such terms-
an unlikely thing in any case-then there would be 
nothing for the court to do but to appoint r,eceivers 
for the property to collect the amounts levied by its 
decree, and to conduct the business until the com-
pany should be wound up under ordinary proceed-
ings or at least until its property should be sold 
out to individuals or corporations for continuance of 
the business, etc., etc. 
33. If its wrongs shall have been of long standing;-
and if repeated and specific remedies or relief or sat:. 
isfaction for past misdeeds cannot be safely decreed 
-then it is not the fault of the court, but of the peo-
ple at large or their representatives in Congress in 
failing to provide a regulatory body, or necessary 
preventative measures, etc. 
34. And it is obvious that, in any event, a decree 
of dissolution which neither collects for damage 
done nor gives relief for wrongs committed, and 
which also fails to actually dissolve and which 
does not reduce the actual size of the so-called mo-
nopoly, or which does not bring about a reduction in 
the so-found oppressive prices or restrain other acts 
of oppression, etc., can be of no particular public 
benefit, from any point of view. 
35. If the Government shall have failed to estab-
lish a regulatory body in due season and if private 
parties concerned have failed to make timely com~ 
plaint of wrongs committed, or while it was prac--
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ticable for the court to give relief, this cannot war-
rant this court or any other court in entering either 
a futile decree or a drastic one, viz. : one decreeing 
di solution-and per sea public loss and injury. · 
36. The whole trend of legislation of late years 
in the way of enlargement of the powers of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission in the establish-
ment of the Federal Trade Commission, together 
with the apparent neglible results of these dissolu-
tion decrees, etc., etc., all seem to prove clearly that 
the court in its "trust" rulings both as to merits and 
methods of relief has simply taken the wrong road 
and should retrace its steps. 
NOTE. Had this court found as facts in the Stand-
ard. Oil case : 
That such combination had attained its form 
and size and position of industrial power 
throiigh a long and persistent policy and purpose of 
unfair elim,ination of rivals; through receipt of il-
legal rebates on freight, and other illegal practices 
and trade acts; had oppressed the public either gen-
erally or in special districts or places; had defied the 
decree of di solution of the Ohio Supreme Court, 
and had escaped any legally prescribed fines or pen-
alties of that or other state courts, etc., etc., and 
Had the court then as a condition for the company 
and its subsidiaries ( tied up by contract or 
corporate form with this tainted combine) to con-
tinue to do interstate business required them to 
turn over their property or a portion of it sufficient 
to amply sati fy all fines, or demands, public anrl pri-
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vate, which a decree could reach, and to turn ovc1 
property to the jurisdiction of the local courts when-
ever necessary to carry out and satisfy their decrees, 
etc., etc.; and 
In the alternative :' 
That receivers should be appointed for the com. 
bine and its constituents and their properties duly 
administered in the interest of the public and parties 
wronged, to satisfy the entire situation, etc., etc.; 
We say: had such a decree been entered, we fail to 
see how any one could validly complain of it. 
But the court in its decision in that case finds that 
the Sherman Act was violated merely by the taking 
of strictly legal steps to increase trade and to get in-
creased economic power ( as every one does who 
takes on a new plant) and then finds that the fraudu-
lent trade acts committed merely emphasized such a 
conclusion-instead of making them the sole basis 
for a decree. 
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m. 
An Analysis of the Standard Oil Decision. 
221 U. S.1. 
In this cause, strangely enough, no appeal was 
made by the counsel for the defendant companies 
that the Northern Securities ruling be formally and 
openly overruled. 
In fact, a cursory reading of one of the briefs-
the one of 190 pages-submitted by Mr. Johnson 
and others-does not reveal even a deliberate ref-
erence to the decision. 
The court, in order to apply its prior ruling to the 
immense record, sought with commendable earnest-
ness, to :find a :fixed ''standard'' which it said '' the 
statute demanded'' i. e., demanded that the court 
supply this standard-i. e., owing to the "general 
language of these (its) provisions." 
And what standard did the court supply? 
Seizing upon the idea that there was a line be-
tween ''teasonableness'' and '' ,unreasonableness''-
i. e., hunting for a constant on which to convict-it 
sought refuge in a "rule of reason." 
And then what '' rule of reason'' did it find ? 
·Not the rule which revealed a line between area-
sonable or unreasonable (i. e., fraudulent) act.; but 
it attempted to draw a line between a reasonable and 
unreasonable growth in trade. 
It did not hold to a test of "restraint of trade/' 
the concrete subject of the statute (Sec. 1), but-
to one involving "competition"; i. e., it attempted 
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to draw a line between reasonable and unreasonable 
competition. 
The advantage of deserting the specific subject of 
the statute for another, and then returning to the 
subject after reasoning out the matter, added noth-
ing but indirection to the process. And '' indirec-
tion is seldom safe.'' 
That is to say : The court, instead of drawing or 
indicating the line between a reasonable ( or. fair) 
and unreasonable ( or fraudulently high) price, or 
between a fair and an oppressive trade act-drew its 
so-called line between a reasonable and an unreason-
able growth or size. And this, too, in a country 
whose corporate laws expressly, and whose indus-
trial policy undeniably allowed all the growth or size 
desirable or which could affect trade or promote the 
greatest trade! 
It was to be assumed, said the court in effect, 
that the intention of Congress was--not to prohibit 
unreasonable prices, unreasonable trade, "forestall-
ing" or "engrossing" the market with avowed in-
tent to enhance prices ( a ternporary or specific 
act) ; it was not against temporary or acute 
acts which would oppress the people and unreason-
ably "restrain trade" and thus imply and safely im-
ply guilt, and hence justly make the parties subject to 
fine and imprisonment, etc., etc.-but the law was 
passed to preserve due or reasonable ''competition'' 
to preserve '' our competitive system' '-as the brief 
of the Attorney General claims; and, as he lately ar-
gued in the Harvester case-'' to preserve the small 
dealer," etc., etc. 
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Then the court as to Section 2, of the act, and in 
order to satisfy the ''demand'' for a ''standard,'' 
proceeds to reason thus: 
That "monopoly" in the strict technical and orig-
inal sense of the term ( meaning a legal grant to one 
to monopolize all the trade in a certain article, and 
this of course being a prohibition against others en-
gaging in such trade), had not existed in England 
for many years, and never had existed in America ; 
that after legal monopolies had been abolished in 
England the term ''monopoly'' had gradually in 
common speech (in England as well as in America), 
become to be frequently used to denote the '' re-
surlts of monopoly and monopolistic practices," 
such as '' forestalling, engrossing,'' etc., and par-
ticularly "the forced enhancement of prices" (all 
sudden, temporary or acute acts which can imply 
. guilt) ; that hence these terms, viz.: '' forestalling 
ap.d engrossing" and "enhancement of prices" must 
be supposed to have been in the minds of Congress-
evidently because they could furnish the much need-
ed ''standard'' ''demanded'' by the act. 
The court then, to support this view, is led to cite 
but one English case, viz.: Mogul Steamship Co. v. 
McGregor, A. C. 25 (1891), in which the plain-
tiff claimed damages from a combination-not one 
that had raised rates or enhanced prices, etc. It was 
an association or combination of ship owners who 
were doing a large part of the trade in ships between 
several Chinese ports and Europe. The association 
had greatly lowered prices and given special if.1.duce-
ments to shippers to ship exclusively by its vessels, 
and thus it was able to increase its trade and dr:aw 
the same from its competitor, plaintiff. Plaintiff 
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claimed that he had been ruined, or threatened with 
ruin, by the loss of trade which thus had been drawn 
to defendants by the ruinous prices and special in-
ducements, etc. 
The whole argument of the various opinions of 
the Lord Justices was that one could not complain of 
"competition" or of combination that resulted ot · 
was intended to result in prices far below even a rea-
sonable or 'living' figure." 
But it was not ruled that an agreement between 
rivals in trade to charge only a certain price, which 
might be found to be reasonable, and for a limited 
time or territory, was illegal (as held in Am. Joint 
Traffic and Trans.-Mo. F 'reight Assn. cases). Much 
less was it ruled· that the combination of the ship 
lines for the purposes of trade was illegal simply 
because it carried "a power to control prices" and 
therefore '' unduly restricted competition.'' 
It was not ruled that the association of plants or 
lines was per se illegal or fixed guilt on the parties 
accused. And such citation seems strangely inade-
quate to support any proposition of the kind. The 
decision was to the effect that even a combination 
between trade units by which their assets and capi-
tal were added together for the very purpose of in-
creasing their own trade and eliminat.ing competi-
tion, was not a '' restraint of trade'' or '' a monop-
oly "-either in a legal or common speech sense. 
The whole 470 pages of briefs on the law in this 
Standard Oil case-tendering this court over 400 ci-
tations-and the 620 pages of briefs on the facts, 
were seemingly tendered this court with no 
claim (that is, with no open and formally expressed 
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claim) that the Northern Securities opinion was 
erroneous, and with no appeal to have said decision 
overruled. And the basis of that opinion was at-
tempted to be disturbed only by arguments which 
here and there conflicted with the reasoning of the 
decision-but for some reason or other lacked this 
candid and formal appeal. And although the cause 
was reargued, it was seemingly reargued upon the 
same basis as originally submitted; and, as in the 
Northern Securities case, no petition for rehearing 
was filed therein. 
And so as to the briefs in the present case. 
They are presented upon the basis that the 
theory of the prior decisions, principally the North-
ern Securities ruling, as explained by the '' rule of 
reason'' in the Standard Oil case is to control the 
record. 
In the brief for the Steel Company it is said (page 
11): 
'' The true interpretation of the terms 'monop-
olize' and 'restraint of trade' as used in these 
sections ( of the Sherman Act) was in doubt for 
a long time after the passage of the act. The 
authors of the act, the members of the bar, and 
the judges themselves, differed more or less 
upon the subject for upwards of twenty years." 
There is evidently, therefore, through the entire 
brief no intimation even-that is, no open and can-
did intimation-that this court's construction of the 
act is wrong, or leaves ''doubt'' as to how to apply 
it. 
It therefore becomes our privilege to attack the 
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prior construction of this act, and to show by our 
feeble demonstration that this construction amounts 
simply to an attempt to make a constant out of a 
variable. 
Nor can we put the responsibility for this result 
upon Congress. ; 
Suppose Congress had specifically enacted that 
' where two legally existing concerns or two individ-
uals engaged in a specific trade should combine their 
assets and plants, in order, if you please, to extin-
guish "competition" between them, the officers of 
the companies or the individuals concerned should 
be "guilty of a misdemeanor," and be punished by 
:fine and imprisonment. What would this court have 
said about such an act, except to hold it unconstitu-
tional? 
What would it have said of such an act, which was 
furth er conditioned : That even though in such case 
an intent to increase the volume of trade in that 
article existed, and although there was concededly 
an intent to reduce prices the parties were still 
guilty? 
How, then, can the court put such construction 
upon a statute passed in general terms-"in general 
language"? An act which does not expressly say 
this, and yet a statute which can be safely interpre-
ted in a way to r easonably :fix guilt, which can be 
safely interpreted to mean unreasonable or fraudn-
lent trade practices, and unreasonable or frait ditlent 
-that is, monopolistic--practices? 
Is it not easily seen that this court has uncon-
sciously dragged the statute from its base-'' re-
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straint of trade "-in order to indirectly "sustain" 
what it is pleased to call our competitive system? 
And what is our "competitive system"? 
There is no definite concept in such a term except 
independence or individuality in trade. And if the 
statute prohibited mergers of independent plants, it 
prohibited all, ALL such mergers. 
If co-operation in trade is not an evil, per se, if 
combination of small trade units is necessary 
in some lin(}s of business in order to obtain the great-
est amount of trade, and frequently absolutely neces-
sa,ry to obtain any substantial part of foreign trade, 
and instead· of depressing healthy competition, is 
frequently an encouragement to (i) competition to 
increase trade, (2) compet-ition to establish reason-
able prices, and (3) com,petition to serve with best 
efficiency the public in the line of the particular 
trade-how do we :find any prolific benefit in a whole-
sale "preservation of our competitive, i. e., inde-
pendent system?" 
This court theref om has lamentably been betrayed 
into attempts to make a constant out of a variable. 
And most able attorneys are bringing records 
to this court of such length that no human brain 
could ever appreciate the showing of even a moder-
ate fraction of the ''evidence'' given, and inviting 
the court to wade through the 1,000 pages or more of 
briefs submitted on each side, to find a count on 
which to convict! The result is a wearisome shift-
ing back and forth in the arguments before the court 
-chasing a will o' the wisp. 
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We do submit that it is indeed dangerous to find a 
question of intent from all the various facts and sug-
gestions submitted here-when no oppression of the 
public has ever been claimed, either in the way of 
enhancement of prices or in the way of reduction of 
trade. 
It is in fact an amazing thing. 
"Two exporting grocers (Mr. Justices Holmes in 
his Northern Securities dissent) are to be '' sent to 
jail"-when it has been an obvious and utter impos-
sibility, either on their part or on the part of any one 
knowing all the facts, to tell when they became 
guilty! 
Conclusion. 
All of the labors of the government's counsel 
as shown by the headings in their brief, and all the 
labors of the court in these several cases, and the 
result of all of its reasoning, ~re shown to hover 
around this one proposition: 
That whereas, there were, (immediately prior to 
the consolidation or to the adoption of the ''device'' 
of the (strictly legal) holding company), a number 
of corporations which were independent of each 
other, and presumably "competing" with each other, 
for iron and steel trade, etc. ; and since they appar-
ently had not-or at least no one of them had-
power "to control prices;" and whereas, immedi-
ately after the consummation of the device, the en-
tire interests or trade represented by the holding 
company and all its subsidiary companies, repre-
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sented an "estimated percentage" ( whether 55 or 60 
or 70%) of the total steel and iron trade of the coun-
try; there[ ore it must be presumed that there was an 
intent from the new formed arrangement in the vari-
ous companies or their officers'' to control prices,'' be-
cause such a large percentage of trade demonstrated 
the power to so control. And hence, the result of 
such arrangement was '' a stifling of competition be-
tween the former subsidiaries" and an attempt "to 
monopolize the whole or a part of the steel and iron 
trade or commerce,'' etc., etc. 
But when, the defendants' counsel answers that 
such an arrangement would result in vast economy 
in handling the percentage of trade (whatever it ac-
tually was) ; when they further answer that it was 
necessary to so integrate the various plants 
and lines of trade, in order to bid for for-
eign trade; when they seek to prove it by the 
vast actual increase in foreign trade from an insig-
nificant to a very large proportion thereof; when 
they point to the fact or claim that prices of the 
same material, ( quality and quantity considered). 
were not greater after the consummation of the de-
vice than they were before, and in fact and upon the 
average were definitely less; when they claim that 
they have shown that the trade of the "non-trust" 
or independent companies has increased in propor-
tion more than the increase of the total trade of the 
Steel Corporation; when they claim that the associa-
tion has also greatly aided in increasing the total 
volume of domestic trade, etc., etc., they are answer-
ed by this amazing proposition: 
That all this is IMMATERIAL, a;nd that they are 
guilty-of what? 
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Of an intent to unduly restrict not trade, but com-
petition,-from which it follows that they are guilty 
of acts in restraint of trade, etc., etc.! 
This we repeat is an amazing situation. And why 
there is no candid and open and vigorous attempt 
made on behalf of the regular counsel for defendant 
corporation to tear to sh eds this false concept is 
equally amazing. 
Is it feared that it would offend this court to sug-
gest that occasionally it may make a mistake? 
It is indeed a false respect for both the ability 
and the candor of the justices of this court to as-
sume that when the court has made a mistake, it will 
not' confess its error, a thing which able justices 
have to do almost daily on the trial bench and jus-
tices in reviewing courts frequently have to do-and 
with no loss of respect from the bar or the public! 
It is true that in the late argument in both the 
Harvester and Steel cases very able arguments 
were given to prove that an intent to re-
strain or monopolize or oppress could not validly 
be inferred from this statute, unconnected with spe-
cific acts of wrong or oppression. But why was it 
not openly said or suggested that the rulings to the 
contrary in both the ''Securities'' and '' Standard 
Oil'' decisions were erroneous? 
When Mr. Justice Pitney asked Mr. Bancroft, 
(for the Harvester Co.), as we recall his 
words: '' I ~otice tha~ the court below based its opin-
ion upon the fact that the Harvester Company con-
trolled 80 or 85 per cent. of the total trade, and 
that this gave you power to control prices in that line 
of trade, and not upon the claim or basis that you 
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actually had raised prices,'' etc., etc. '' I should like 
you to direct your argument to this feature of the 
case.'' 
Mr. Bancroft (unconsciously no doubt) declined 
the gavge or challenge thus tendered him-and there-
by missed his opportunity. 
He answered with a very able argument to show 
that wrong intent could not be gathered from an 
act of combination or consolidation where the con-
solidated entity had existed for many years in ac-
tual practice, and when no enhancement of prices or 
other specific trade acts of oppression, etc., etc., had 
been perpetrated or claimed to ha.ve been perpe-
trated for at least 10 years last past-etc., and 
then spoiled it all by his assertion that that was the 
law "as he understood the decisions." (The "trust" 
decisions of this court.) 
It is time for some one to candidly suggest that 
the court has e1·red in these ''trust'' decisions, and 
thus render it the best service that can be given it 
in these uniquely burdensome and brain-wearying 
cases, and which are leading us-nowhere. 
Respectfully submited, 
HARRY s. MECARTNEY. 
137 So. La Salle St., 
Chicago, March 20, 1917. 
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To our Brethern, 
the Justices of our National Supreme Court: 
I attempt herein to voice a plea, which as one 
in the throng I seem to hear from the younger gen-
eration of America as uttered from a vantage ground 
of view or vision which, of necessity, it occupies 
alone. 
The fallibility of human judgment is not meas-
ured by the human mind or what it lacks. If so, a 
body of jurists selected, as are the justices of this 
court, from a large number of men trained in legal 
logic, would rarely disagree upon clear-cut ques-
tions of legal principle, and an error of the major-
ity in a thoroughly considered case of that kind 
would be almost a marvel. 
But early environment limits our view; custom 
draws us into by-ways; dangers imagined in youth 
bring ''fears in the way'' in old age; and ripened 
judgment and honest patient effort have to yield a 
tribute to these tyrants of experience and occasion-
ally at their behest to step from the path of accur-
acy into the field of error . This is true of us all. 
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The older generation have fought and conquered 
the hard pressing issues of their younger day. The 
younger have thus been left freei in their early 
youth to diagnose issues in embryo, and by the 
time these have grown large and have to be met 
are more familiar with them, have taken their meas-
ure, are more ready with weapons for the fray, 
have selected the vulnera"ble places for attack, are 
more confident of victory. 
In the logical trend of things the younger genera-
tion have been carried farther on in the road to 
progress, farther up the mountain towards the pin-
nacle of universal peace. 
Here is their vantage ground. 
The call to service does not necessarily summon us 
to tread beaten paths or to observe set forms, or to 
repeat time-worn amenities. 
The '' officer of the court'' sworn to aid it-to 
const(J/Yl,tly aid it-in the ascertainment of truth,-
in the upholding of truth,- is not bound to conceal 
his knowledge of a vital error having been com-
mitted until the curriculum of a widely variant prac-
tice shall bring around a similar case or bury it for-
ever. Nor is a paid retainer the only key to unlock 
the breast of a / aithful officer and loose the secret 
there concealed and prompt an appeal for justice and 
right. 
The justices of the court sworn to support the 
constitution and uphold the law are not bound to 
hide any conviction of error committed and allo": 
legal rights to be abridged or destroyed, and con-
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fusion to increase until perchance some one affected 
by the error shall divine that the judges have per-
ceived their error AND will be willing to acknowledge 
it. 
It makes no difference that custom has sanctioned 
this cou·rse. The development of character and the 
enlargement of soul may involve the departure from 
ruts of error as well as an adherence to the lines 
of truth; and each refusal to so depart where the 
duty seems clear, adds a new sin to one's record. 
The secret of error committed in innocence becomes 
burdened with the guilt of concealment. 
So, feeling that the high court of the land has 
erred in a case off ar-reaching importance which will 
add to the already fast gathering confusion, tend 
to put off the day of ultimate reckoning and to fur-
ther obscure the light in a day of much darkness, 
the writer submits this appeal to the justices to re-
consider the issue of competition or co-operation, 
and to the majority ( or to any one of them) to_ con-
fess to themselves and of record their error if they 
have erred and can discern it; or that they announce 
that the principles involved in the "Merger" deci-
sion will be re-considered upon a proper case pre-
sented. 
My call to respond: It is in the line of my pro-
fession. 
My warrant: Born in America. 
In the name of the common people who demand 
that the most vital principles of the day be not an-
nounced in the highest court of the land with a div-
ided judicial mind and heart; 
In the name of the patriots of America who are 
pained to see the press explaining divisions among 
the justices as caused by partisan bias and belief 
in the truth of which is of necessity fostered· by such 
repeated divisions; 
In the name of those ambitious to serve by for-
mulating wholesome and efficient measures for re-
lief and who can have full confidence in legal prin-
ciples upon which to build, only when announced by 
a united court, and whose work requires that ob-
structions be cleared from the way; 
In the name of the labor unions and other co-op-
era tive bodies of America who rightfully wonder 
whether ''competition'' demands an undivided fealty 
in economics, and rules our industrial destiny-is 
omni-beneficial; or whether "co-operation" ha,s any 
warrant for recognition, and whether the bond which 
bind_s them together for co-operative effort is tainted 
and ignoble;-
The younger generation appeals for a re-consid-
eration of the principles involved in the Northern 
Securities case. 
To the end that a united court or a more united 
court may utter the verdict ''void'' or ''valid,'' and 
the way be cleared for action and advance. 
The nation ought to anticipate impending evils 
by preventative measures. And where evils have 
grown up for the want of such measures they ought 
to be promptly corrected. 
5 
Usually the people neither prevent nor promptly 
correct; they have to be driven to face about after 
they have suffered from disaster. 
Such disaster may sometimes be def erred by an 
erroneous judicial fiat, which temporarily relieves 
the pressure or relieves it in certain places; but it 
is bound to be all the more momentous and dread 
when it does come. 
Great crises in a nation's internal affairs never 
come unannounced. There is always a herald whose 
warning is not heeded ; there are ominous rumblings 
which are laughted at or willingly diagnosed as acci-
dental or incidental or ultra-distant. 
The Demon of Evil does not openly and boldly 
destroy. He first confuses, and while his prospec-
tive victims are looking in various directions or 
accusing each other, and their systems are tempo-
rarily deranged and disordered, he innoculates his 
insidious poison. 
America has become intensely commercialized. 
The god of Mammon reigns. He demands heavy 
tribute from all individuals and institutions. Courts 
formerly useful in building up deliberately a science 
of legal rights are now strained to repeat, at the 
instance of oppressors and speculators, their time-
worn decrees and announcements, leaving but little 
time for the consideration of vital and "pioneer" 
cases. They are thus of necessity rushed into error 
a large part of th.e tim,e and thus is fostered division 
and the now common and essentially ominous dis-
sent. 
The frequent errors of high sta.te courts have now 
become alarming; and many divisions and dissents 
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in the court of ultimate national judicial authority 
proves-must of necessity prove-frequent error. 
Much is thus added to the fast gathering confusion; 
and this occurring so often in the most vital cases 
gives alone a heavy impetus towards the danger 
brink; or makes a heavy draft upon the nation's 
economies, and hence upon its welfare and its life. 
Epoch-making issues must be settled correctly or 
grave consequences follow. Epoch-making decisions 
must not be allowed to remain as first declared by 
a divided court, or calmly submitted to by the whole 
people of the country with a "so goes the world" 
sigh of resignation. 
The consequences are too serious. 
It is not the money interests of Mr. Hill and his 
associates that have been involved here. 
It is not railroad rates or the quality of service 
to the communities served by the two or three roads 
in question. 
The question is, rather, shall a nation grown old 
and highly developed industrially, its territory cov-
ered with a close network of railroads and other 
trade arteries, be allowed to combine its establish-
ments and roads in the interest of economy to the 
whole people; or shall this be prevented upon the 
plea that mankind is naturaly sel:fish, cannot be 
trusted, and that therefore it is dangerous to be 
economical? 
It is whether "making money" is to be forever 
assumed to be the chief ambition of man and the goal 
. of his "prosperity" and be he forever encouraged 
to treat it as such, and that therefore co-operative 
agencies or instruments are not to be encouraged 
• 
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for fear of greed controlling the exercise of the 
increased powers. 
It is whether in the onward march of the nation at 
large towards its goal of sacrifice and ministry, it 
may try to husband its energies, save repetition in its 
local systems, and so co-operate in its public and 
semi-public industries and utilities as to spare the 
greatest number of people for alleviating and minis-
tering to needy ones at home and abroad. 
To correctly settle such question, it will do but 
little good to look over decided cases. We must look 
to the future and have visions and some conceptions 
of the destiny of the country at large. 
What is this destiny? 
Continued and increasing sway of the god of Mam-
mon, commercialism forever, the masses financially 
subjugated, the ceaseless struggle for positions of 
vantage and power over each other,-constant rest-
lessness,-hopelessness,-death? 
Or, equity in dealing, justice, forbearance, sac-
rifice, hopefulness, vision, service to other nations, 
world redemption? 
If the latter, is not" co-operation" the watchword 
for advanee, the aecompaniment of collective effort 
for others f And if so, what is the import of a . de-
cree which stifles this battle-cry? 
Whenever courts have gone wrong in cases involv-
ing grave questions of public policy or economy, fear 
of some imagined pending evil or disaster has been 
usually the lodestone of error. 
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'' As man thinketh in his heart, so is he,'' applies 
not merely to questions of morality. 
"As Justice fears in her heart, so is she," could 
accurately be written of decrees human. 
What is it that Justice has feared in this caseT 
The possibility that one corporation or set of men 
might control the whole iransportation system of the 
coimtry. 
But, suppose such a thing were economical to the 
general public of the country. 
Suppose it were more convenient for the general 
public of the country. 
Supposing the aggregate wealth, the aggregate 
trade, if you please, of the whole country were there-
by increased? 
What then? 
To say that the nation at large would be incapable 
of regulating such a company is to confess national 
weakness, and to run away from an ·issue that pos-
sibly must be met. 
We are passing-have passed-the bend in the 
river. We must not refuse to turn about and look 
ahead. Driven by Necessity toward the headland of 
Satisfaction, we have refused to turn up the broad 
highway of Sacrifice and Ministry. And Prejudice 
and Habit have made us willingly blind to the rocks 
of Commercialism and Greed directly ahead. Now 
we doubt each other, are blaming each other, are 
quarreling with each other; we refuse to turn about; 
and the hell-whisper of "Paternalisrn and Social-
ism" is more audible to us than the stentorian ap-
peal "Courage and Co-opera,tion," the battle-cry of 
our professed faiths. 
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Brethern of the Bench: Let us whisper a word of 
courage : America is strong enough, she has courage 
enough to meet the issue brought upon herself-
Co-operation or Stagnation, God or Mammon, Life 
or Death! 
Do her not the wrong of keeping her eyes blinded 
to the issue which has long pressed upon her and 
is pressing harder the while, and to her full, duty 
of marshalling for co-operative effort and master 
strokes her minions in error and unhappiness, as 
well as those whose ideals are healthful and true, 
but whose energies are unused and dormant. 
Justice, too, not only fears, but she also has fads 
and bugaboos. She sins not from plain dishonesty. 
She yearns to do right. But she is "renewed like 
the eagle'' from generation to generation in her 
foibles and prejudices, as well as in her strength. 
These uncrown her at times without her knowing it 
and work ruin in her courts. 
We can bring to the justices of this court no rules 
of logic unknown to them. 
We can add nothing to their powers of reasoning. 
We can analyze cases no better than has been done, 
and fuller analysis would d no good. 
But may we not appeal for more confidence in 
America's coming yeomanry and add testimony that 
it can and means to fight its battles with weapons 
fit, and to meet issues-to conquer 7 
May we of the younger ge~eration not appeal for 
the privilege of bearing the burden which is ours, 
10 
to be allowed to feel the full pressure of issues which 
confront us? 
May we not protest against the fear of combina-
tion, and question the warrant which forbids us co-
operation? 
May we not volunteer in the present and add our 
vision of the future? 
May it not be that we have all been looking too 
closely to the mountain of precedent piling up, and 
thus have been tied to the past, and forgotten to 
look to the future for our hope and to find the path 
we must tread? 
The milestone cases of this court of the earlier 
day were not nominated by precedent .and the phras-
ings of constitutions were not interpreted by wad-
ing through its mazes. The destiny of the country 
was looked to and this as dictated, by the vision of 
a faithful strenuous lived race. 
Has this case been argued with this destiny kept 
constantly in view? If so, we cannot discern it in the 
briefs. 
Analysis and logic might be sufficient for such 
cases if they were reasoned on principle alone; but 
if it is tried to drag them through many and com-
plex reported cases the course is long and devious; 
and it is too much to expect that nine men can cor-
rectly travel the whole sinuous course from end to 
end and come out at the same exit unless the way· 
is lighted from above. 
May we not be passing the bend of the river, where 
wasteful competition must be left behind and effec-
tive co-operation must be the watchword Y 
11 
With all due deference, it is no "mere economic 
question which this court need not consider or deter-
mine.'' 
The question here is whether a thing is an evil-
a public evil. And as this thing is one of trade, it 
is a trade question, an economic question. If the 
thing is such evil, it falls witp.in the prohibition 
of the Congress of the country. If it is not, it can-
not fall within it. 
No one contends or claims that in express terms 
any certain style of corporations or any certain 
method of incorporating was interdicted. It is not 
a question, therefore, as to whether a particular 
method or techniqite, as it were, is illegal. 
The question is whether a certain principle of ac-
tion shall be condemned, which principle may be 
necessary for the progress of the nation or for the 
achievement of its destiny, or to save its very life? 
This principle is co-operation. 
Have the arguments dwelt prominently with this 
principle, or carried it out to its ultimate scope, or 
shown clearly how the decree of the court of neces-
sity condemns itT 
If not (and it is thought that they have not) there 
is yet a niche to :fill. 
We said above the '' omin us dissent.'' But it is 
ominous not only to the public; it is so to the court 
itself. 
In the Trans-Missouri case as well as in the pres-
ent case, Mr. Justice White protested that the court's 
decision condemned in principle every labor union, 
the members of which had associated themselves to-
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gether to better their condition and obtain reason-
able wages. 
If this should be so, is not the error of the deci-
sion capable of being made so clear that every sane, 
hard-headed mechanic or laboring man throughout 
the country will not only believe it, but be able to 
see why it is so. 
Says Mr. Justice Holmes : '' The question here is 
whether two exporting grocers should go to jail;'' 
and that the decision holds illegal every ordinary 
partnership or association, etc., throughout the coun-
try, which has been made by competing tradesmen. 
If this be true, will not the small partner or stock-
holder, as well as the large and prominent one, be 
able to see itT 
The common yeoman can usually tell, on the facts 
being given, whether the two exporting grocers 
should go to jail. The laborer and mechanic live in 
the principles which dictate and support an effort 
to secure betterment of their condition; and if the 
Supreme Court of the land has run counter to such 
principles in its deliberate and studied judgment or 
decree, they will sooner or later discern it. If such 
a decision does affect and condemn such organiza-
tions and their earnest efforts to bring about better 
wages and better conditions, in the very nature of 
things it will not be long until this court will either 
have to renounce its doctrine and vote its decisions 
erroneous or will be invited to enter judgment 
against inter-state labor unions and similar bodies, 
a thing which it will find itself very reluctant to do. 
Are not the warnings of Justices White and 
Holmes in these two cases, potent with the sugges-
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tion that another effort ought to have been made and 
still ought to be made, to have the justices agree 1 
Is it not just possible that error has been made and 
in a matter both vital and simple of understanding? 
Do not the dissent of four judges make it probable? 
The frequent dissent of so many judges must of 
necessity weaken, has of necessity heavily weakened, 
the confidence of the people at large in this court,-
waving entirely aside the professional agitator, and 
the yellow journal editor, and counting only the great 
body of respectful, law-abiding, unprejudiced, hard-
headed and just citizens. 
A court of rugged :fidelity and highest intelligence, 
its dissentient decrees have been the rule for years 
in matters of most vital import. This is enough in 
and of itself to alarm reflecting lawyers and citizens. 
To assume that the majority of one has been con-
stantly right, is to assign to that one mammoth men-
tal parts and unnatural superiority to his colleagues. 
This might explain the situation if the dissenters 
were the same judges all the time, or the dominating 
vote came uniformly from the same judge. 
No, we cannot explain the dissents or divisions 
that way. The ability and industry of the judges 
are not questioned by anybody. We doubt if Mar-
shall and his worthy colleagues would have been 
more uniform in their opinions had they been doing 
or attempting to do the work that this court is 
trying to do to-day. 
But that brings us to another vital point or sug-
gestion which no doubt ere this has been raised in 
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the mind of the reader: How can this court tran-
sa.ct the business thrown upon it with promptness 
and dispatch, and yet have time for the reconsider-
ation or rehearing of cases, or for ultra-earnest and 
exhaustive efforts on the part of its justices to agree? 
It cannot. 
But it can give such deliberation to cases it does 
decide. It can be particularly careful with its "pio-
neer" or turning-point cases, leaving to the Con-
gress and other agencies the reframing or remodel-
ing of the system of practice so as to relieve its 
congested docket. 
That this is necessary there is no doubt. And the 
writer will not dodge the challenge implied in the 
suggestion, viz., what plan therefor is feasible 7 We 
will not prolong this document with a long argument, 
but just outline some suggestions "in the rough." 
(NoTE: Here are omitted some six or eight pages 
devoted to suggestions as to how the congested 
docket of the court could be relieved.) 
The chain of reasoning running through the ma-
jority opinion is as follows: 
Congress has power to regulate inter-state trade; 
these two "merged" carriers are engaged in such 
trade; they are thus subject to regulation by Con-
gress; 
The object of the anti-trust act was, and its lan-
guage imports as much, to protect the public from 
combinations, co·nspiracies, etc., which restrain such 
trade ; a merger of two ''competing'' or independent 
lines or establishments engaged in such trade ex-
tinguished competition between them; 
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The extinguishment of cornpetition between two 
sitch lines or establishments in and of itself restrains 
trade; hence the merger of these independent or com-
peting lines is ivithin the prohibition of the act. 
There are two unsound links in the chain-the ones 
italicized. 
What is this "competition," which term the court 
• has read into this actT 
''Competition,' '-a seekino- too-ether. 
Seeking what T 
Seeking trade T 
Or to make money through trade T 
Or to make the most money with the least trade? 
Or to a-et the most trade without losing any money 
while making little or no profit T 
Or to give the best possible service for the most 
money? 
Or to give the poorest service consistent with mak-
ing much money-or little money-or merely a fair 
living-or simply keeping above the point of actual 
loss T 
Or to give good service to the public, even at the 
point of much actual loss-or little actual loss-or 
no loss-or little profit-or fair profit-or gross 
profit? 
Do all independent concerns, "competing" con-
cerns, agree in their policies and tally in the degree 
of intensity in their purposes T 
If they do, what is this policy, and at what point 
is this intensity! 
If they do not, of what definite value, or how 
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definite is this "competition" that has been made to 
do this yeoman duty in interpreting the act of .Con-
gressf 
What is competition,-this alleged priceless boon 
in the trade world,-this supposed self-acting regu-
lator or governor of the laws of trade in the interest 
of the public T 
Competition has been confused with the induce-
ment to compete. 
If I hold a piece of meat before two hungry dogs, 
a struggle for the meat might and usually would re-
sult; yet the meat-the inducement for the struggle 
-must no.t be confused with the struggle itself. 
It is not absolutely certain that such a struggle for 
the meat will result-one dog may fear the other 
and not try for it, ot he may imagine that meat will 
not agree with him, or he may have compassion on 
his hungry companion, etc. 
If there is enough meat for both dogs, there is not 
apt to be a very great struggle on the part of either. 
But, however this may be, the point of the illus-
tration is, that the inducement to compete is not com-
petition, even in dog nature-and that even '.' dog 
competition'' does not follow automatically from the 
inducement. 
A live beef in a corral close to an armed starving 
Englishman would logically have but one fate in 
999 instances out of a 1,000; before a starving Hin-
doo, it would likewise have but one fate-but a 
wholly different one-it would be perfectly safe from 
molestation. Yet in the former instance the placing 
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of the beef before the Englishman could not be said 
to have directly caused its death. 
The merger, therefore, of two independent and 
competing establishments does not in and of itself 
extinguish the effort of each to serve the public to 
the best of their ability. 
The public has no direct interest in the struggle or 
rivalry between two independent establishments-
it has what it is pleased to call an interest in the 
"benefits" of competition. It has a right to prompt 
service and reasonable prices,. Has it a right to 
rwinous prices-prices established by one man, which 
will ruin himself and all his competitors f 
And if the public gets its service and its reason-
able prices, what interest has it beyond this? 
The second fallacy in the opinion is in the basal 
assumption so often reiterated, that the extingu.ish-
ment of competition is a restraint of trade. 
Here is the great lodestone of error, the blind 
alley-the air-hole-the maze. 
T'o extinguish actual competition between what 
may be naturally competing establishments, without 
substituting anything else, may lead to public detri-
ment. ' 
To co-operate and joi.n means and resources for 
the purpose of increasing trade and developing new 
territory, is a different thing. 
It makes no difference that the ultimate object in 
such co-opera.taion is the making of money. For it 
will certainly be conceded that the main incentive to 
business enterprise is making money; and the induce-
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ment for more enterprise would seem logically and 
legitimately to be the making of more money. 
What has led this court to assume that only evil 
comes from a combination which happens to extin-
guish the inducement to compete, or that it can 
bring no advantages of economy, or public conven-
ience, etc., which must be set off against such com-
petition and a balance struck before the net evil or 
net good be ascertained? 
The court reasons: That Congress in express terms 
has not for bidden mergers or consolidations, but 
only such as restrain trade; as mergers or consoli-
dations of independent or competing establishments 
do restrain trade, the ref ore the same are within the 
inhibition of the act. 
Then the court proceeds to say that it has no con-
cern with the question of whether such mergers, etc. 
may be a public benefit, i. e., do not restrain trade, 
for Congress has by its :fiat said that all combina-
tions which· restrain trade, are illegal. 
A more complete begging of the question, it is hard 
to conceive. 
And the court proceeds to say: That if this merger 
is allowed, then further mergers could be allowed, 
until still much more gigantic mergers would be able 
to fix prices over .a large territory and possibly ·the 
whole country. And when it is answered that Oon-
gress could regulate such rates, and therefore that 
the fear thus used by the court is unfounded, the 
court replies that, if Congress could do so, it has 
not chosen to do so, but has simply decreed that 
such mergers are illegal-around the circle again. 
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Will the justices deny that the approbation of a 
manager may be and often is sufficient to bring out 
the best service in a foreman or other employe Y 
That healthy rivalry between each other for good 
marks by the manager is inducement enough for the 
best service of such foremen or workmen Y 
That genuine public service and public approba-
tion and uniform testimony to a business life well 
spent, may be inducement enough for men to do their 
business well, to be fair in :fixing rates, and to prompt 
them to ''mergers,'' if you please, solely in the in-
terest of economy, greater development and better 
service? 
Why may not two competing establishments or 
lines of railroad be run to their fullest capacity un-
der one management and give out their best service 
to the public? Have they no inducement to do so Y 
May not duty to one's self and one's community be 
such an inducement? 
Is it not easy to believe that people can or can 
learn to love their community enough to use energy 
and ·means in its service? 
Brethern of the Robe: The younger generat~on of 
America does not intend to grovel in ruts of selfish-
ness, or even in ruts of service. It is not going to 
suck the life-blood of a cofillil.unity through corpor-
ate oppression, or seek to appropriate the labor of 
large numbers of comrades in service at starvation 
wages, and then stand around waiting for war to 
show its "patriotism." And it is not going to al-
low others to do so. 
It resents any volunteered estimate of America's 
manhood which pictures it as grasping and bound to 
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grasp all it can to the point of straining the cotm-
try 's institutions and '' rendering Congress help-
less" against its exactions. 
And by the way, it wonders why, if '' inter-state 
trade is a unit'' over which the power of Congress 
is" absolute and supreme," there is any doubt about 
the power of Congress o regulate the rates of such 
traffic, and to see to it that they are not exorbitant 
and oppressive. 
It wonders why the court should even take pains 
"to express no opinion" on this subject, when the 
court itself finds its chief inspiration in the f ear of 
public oppression by heavy rate exactions. 
May not love of country, love of service, love of 
God, be as natural an inditcement, as great a magnet, 
pendent lines, as the approbation of a human supe-
placed over one railroad management of two inde-
rior is over a foreman or workman of one line T 
Are we not to believe that human nature is grow-
ing better, that it may, if its responsibilities are 
placed upon it, grow better? And does it not need 
its struggles and its risks to grow stronger and 
more rugged T 
And are there no exceptions to the rule-even 'if 
such rule be dictated by experience-that men will 
get all they can take and will oppress if they have 
the opportunity, and that conipetition is the only 
spur to wholesome effort and the only check 011 op-
pression T 
Have we forgotten the American patriots of the 
Revolutionary period who placed their fortunes at 
the service of their country ip. time of need T 
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Have we forgotten the honest shoemakers of our 
home villages, who insisted on making good boots 
and for an honest wage T 
Was the man, who during a fuel famine refused 
to sell his cordwood to the speculators, but sold all 
to consumers at ante-famine prices, a freak? · 
Is the '' Village Blacksmith'' a myth? 
How has America fallen from her high estate when 
the highest court in the land rules in effect that its 
countless minions are debased by greed, will continue 
so, and that its mighty Congress is "powerless in 
the premises. That the patriots who will give their 
lives for it in war will not give their means to it in 
peace, or will not refrain from injuring it, and can 
never be taught or trained up to so act, that its 
ideals are myths, its religion of service a sham! 
We spoke of crises : 
Instantly the mind reverts to war or riots, or sud-
den and widespread disaster, and speculates upon 
the question how near do either of these impend 1 
If we seem to be in no immediate danger, all tem-
porary fear is dispelled and the writer is put down. 
as an alarmist. 
Crises, however, are not alone those occasions 
where the public peace is threatened. 
Whether a crisis attends the taking of any par-
ticular step is not measured by the ma.rgin between 
such step and open riot or manifest calamity. 
As a matter of fact, no government is safe when 
the lives of its people are essentiaUy wrong. 
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When, however, the problem of governmental safe-
ty may be supposed to be pretty well solved, crises 
will be the turning points in the lives and economies 
of the people. 
If this decision were to the effect that all labor 
unions in America were illegal combinations, and 
that this court would enjoin all or any such unions 
as were interstate or affected interstate trade, it 
would startle every American citizen and the occa-
sion would be recognized as a crisis. 
Yet, four of the nine justices think and say that the 
decision does condemn the basal principle of such 
unions. 
Why is this fact alone not enough both to suggest 
and command a rehearing or a reconsideration of 
the principles involved T 
If t1:1-e nation at large has reached the parting of 
the ways ; and the people recognize that they must 
now take the highway of co-operation to reach their 
future goal; if this is so manifest, if the basic eco-
nomic laws and impulses a.re so :firm and so strong as 
to start and keep them on this road or highway, in 
spite of an occasional court decree producing confu-
sion here and there, it will be said a decree as this is 
not so critical after all-no particular disaster will 
result. 
But is it not-must it not be a crisis in the history 
of this court, and a heavy blur upon its record? 
Shall the courts be left behind beckoning to the 
forsaken way and forging fragmentary chains of 
error on the soundless anvil of precedent and fear? 
In the beginning of the argument which accom-
23 
panies this plea (Part II), there is set out in over 
fifty numbered paragraphs, a number of observa-
tions of the writer which were printed and issued 
some weeks before the merger decision was rendered 
in this court. The pamphlet was written before any 
study of the cases. It was meant to show the eco-
nomi~ truths which seemed to the writer to appear 
from one's actual experiences before the maze of 
decisions were entered. 
Its main plea is a dual one: co-operation and regu-
lation. 
The history of events since the pamphlet was writ-
ten has only confirmed this plea. The present effort 
of Congress made within a few months is to pass 
regulatory laws and increase the power of the In-
terstate Commission. 
The people are taking, have taken the right road. 
It is little credit to them. They should have taken 
it years ago; and have been driven into the road by 
sheer force of an economic law and for self-protect-
ion. 
Yet the point is, the people are marching on and 
now invite the court to follow. Will it not feel im-
pelled to do so 7 
The court feared a combination which would con-
trol '' the whole transportation system of the coun-
try.'' But Mr. Prouty ( of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission), points out in his article of last June, 
in ''North American Review,'' that for quite a while 
a big majority of the railroad mileage of the United 
States is controlled by a half-dozen individuals-the 
event which the court feared has practically existed 
for quite a while. 
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You see, court decisions and the cry "Down with 
the trusts,'' have not destroyed, the trusts or pre-
vented their growth. 
In the sajd accompanying suggestions we seek to 
prove this outline : 
(a) Untrammeled competition, recognized as 
healthful in building up the early industries of the 
country, is now in certain lines of industry, unhealth-
ful, and its continued practice occasions waste. 
(b) The ''trust,'' is an economic growth and an 
economic necessity. 
(c) It brings increased power to individuals by 
reason of its combination features. 
( d) Therefore, it demands special regulation; 
and special security against acts of oppression may 
be required of it. 
( e) The cost of this regulation is the price of the 
saving by means of the trust. 
It was also said : 
'' The form of trust mentioned in the Sherman Act 
is a trust to restrain trade. 
'' The ever odious 'trust' of the popular conception 
as well as of the demago!Z'lle on the stump is the trust 
of oppression. It was more prevalent a decade ago 
than now. The trust of healthy economy of fair 
wages and legitimate returns has been more in evi-
dence lately. The trust of the future will be this lat-
ter trust with returns of promoters or managers held 
for public uses or used for the common good. The 
'trust' may act for good or for evil. Whatever its 
action may be, however, its warrant for EXISTENCE is 
co-OPERATION. .And to condemn co-operation is to 
condemn life itself." 
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The fear of this court is not primarily of the trust; 
The fear of the people is not primarily of the trust; 
The fear is that the American people are so supine, 
so confused, so tied up by selfishness and so dormant 
in their ideals of civic duty and civic patriotism, 
so bound to a rank and silly partisanship, etc., etc., 
that they will not rouse themselves to use their in-
herent supei·visory power to control these creatures 
that economic progress has brought to them. 
Were this issue the ultimate test of American citi-
zenship this court could not save the people from 
the issue. 
The syllogism of the majority opinion restated is: 
(1) To destroy competition is baneful to the pub-
lic and therefore illegal. 
(2) To own to the point of controlling both these 
roads gives the power to destroy competition between 
them. 
(3) Where this power to destroy competition is 
thus acquired this in and of itself operates to destroy 
it. 
That ·is, the coming of the power into existence, 
its very a.dvent, destroys competition-that is, the 
power to destroy competition and competition itself 
cannot exist at the same moment; that is, the induce-
ment to use the power to destroy is destruction itself 
-the inducement works automatically, as it were-
is an actor-is alive a11d working-human nature in 
the main is bent one way-is debased-cannot re-
strain the automatic working of the inducement! 
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Is not the complete non-sequitur in the third prop-
osition glaringly apparent? 
It is confusing competition with the inducement to 
compete. 
It is about as logical as to say that a man by taking 
a position where he can throw stones at either of 
two houses, hits one of them; or that by the mere fact 
that one has come to a crossroads he must be held 
to intend to take the wrong road instead of the 
right one. 
The responsibility for erroneous decisions in the 
Trans-Missouri case and in this case (if they be 
both found erroneous) does not rest alone with this 
court. 
The fear of the trust combination or merger, open-
ly expressed by this court in argument and opinions, 
was prompted by love of country and was uttered in 
the people's interest. The court was entitled to be 
met on this ground. 
But it was not. An adequate consideration of the 
people's interest in the broad question and their 
protection from the increased economic power inher-
ent in the trust, clearly involved this issue. Yet, 
outside of a few occasional skeleton suggestions, the 
court received but scanty argument along this line. 
The word "co-operation" was little used-the 
word ''regulation'' still less. There was no appeal 
on the part of the railroads to be regulated. 
There was no one appealing to this court to warn 
the people by its decree that the time has arrived 
"and even now is" for them to 1,se their power of 
regulation. 
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Some would say: "This is true for a very evi-
dent reason. The railroads did not want to be regu-
lated. Their lawyers were controlled in their in-
terests. They did not dare give out their fullest 
light.'' 
This may be the true explanation. But we pref er 
to think that the lack of argument in the line of regu-
lation was rather due to non-appreciation of this 
feature of the subject and to the idea prevalent 
throughout the country that anything which might 
tend to restrict the piling up of immense fortunes 
in the hands of railroad magnates or other captains 
of industry was ''paternalistic'' and a hamper upon 
'' enterprise. '' 
Nevertheless, whatever the reason, we make bold 
to say that these cases were not fully argued cer-
tainly from the standpoint of the public interest. 
For instance, in the brief of Mr. Bunn, in the pres-
ent case, where the decision of the Circuit judges is 
entirely cut to pieces by inexorable logic, as it is 
thought, the word ''co-operation'' is scarcely used at 
all, and no suggestion of regulation is made therein. 
While one is apt to be misunderstood, the ef-
fort to have this court set itself right'' and that right 
early'' in this matter of vital public concern, even 
though made by an humble pen, surely cannot be 
inconsistent with a keen sense of justice,. and a re-
gret to see wrong unrighted. 
In this day of gathering confusion the nation ap-
peals above all for accuracy in all her affairs, and 
especially in the decrees of her courts. _She recog-
nizes that her people sin against her. She also 
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recognizes that they will correct these when they see 
them. 
She recognizes that without new issues to meet 
she will stand still and then decay; and she asks that 
no incorrect, though well-meant, decree shall shield 
her from the :fight. 
Error in vital cases in er courts results in injury, 
and its consequences directly and indirectly but 
surely gravitate down to and reach the lives of her 
subjects; their labor is thus wasted, their efforts 
rendered futile, their welfare affected, they lose--
they suffer. 
If our country has destiny and a soul, it appeals, 
silently it is true, but appeals all the same for a 
chance to develop her soul and approach that destiny. 
And it surely cannot be wrong for one, who seems 
to see obstructions placed in her path, to do his share 
towards removing them. 
Error is not only wrong-it wownds. 
Error has wounded America I 
To trace the cause of this error and display it 
clearly to the justices of this court is the work of an 
able champion. But no able champion is attempt-
ing it. 
And it would seem not to be wrong for the humblest 
who seems to see the wound in her side to beckon to 
it; feeling that pain must be there to invite to as-
suage it; seeing the lips mechanically obedient to 
precedent and habit, to attempt to release them, and 




1. As population grows more dense the industrial 
system of the country 
(a) Becomes more complex; 
(b) Demands greater centralization in its man-
agement; 
( c) Casts greater responsibility upon its man-
agers; 
(d) Gives greater opportunity for oppression; 
hut 
( e) Brings the greater necessity for effective 
police regulations, 
(f) The greater the penalties that should ac-
company abuse of responsibility, both by pre-
scribed punishment and public opprobrium. 
(g) And the more security should accompany 
the centralization of power to protect against 
oppression. 
2. The more generally an industry touches or af-
fects the people at large, 
(a) The more public it is, and hence 
(b) The stronger it bids for public-i. e., gov-
ernmental-regulation. 
( c) The greater the penalties and loss arising 
from the lack of regulation, and hence 
( d) The greater the cost of any prejudices 
which may keep us from taking such a logical 
step or adopting a plan of regulation. 
3. The older an industry becomes 
(a) The more highly developed it is apt to be-
come. 
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(b) The greater the necessity of centralization 
from the standpoint of both economy and con-
venience. 
( c) And hence the more public it is apt to be-
come and the more it is apt to need public 
recognition. 
( d) The less the benefit to the public at large 
from actual competition, and 
~ 
( e) The greater waste in competition, 
(f) The grea.ter does co-operation figure in its 
economy and effectiveness. 
4. The greater and more intense the commerce of 
the nation becomes, 
(a) The more stringent the police measures re-
quired for its regulation, 
(b) The more does national regulation and 
supervision become necessary, 
( c) And the greater the confusion from vari-
ance in local and state regulations and the 
greater the aggregate waste and public loss 
therefrom. 
5. The greater the capital required for the estab-
lishment of an industry affecting the public at large 
(like, for instance, a railroad), 
(a) The greater the waste from actual compe-
tition occasioning the building of entire new 
lines where they are unnecessary for the pub-
lic service. 
(b) While the necessity of public regulation of 
the established lines is all the greater. 
6. The greater the number of railroads in the 
country, 
(a) The greater necessity for centralized man-
agement and 
(b) Assured permanent policies, and thus 
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( c) Combinations among owners, 
( d) The greater the aggregate waste and con-
fusion and inconvenience from the want of 
such combinations. 
7. The larger and more extensive the railroads of 
the country, 
(a) The more stringent should be their super-
vision. 
(b) The less effective is local supervision and 
more urgent the call for national supervision. 
Now, it would not seem hard for a candid observer 
to recognize : 
1. That the industrial system of the country is 
complex; 
2. That the railroad industry affects the people 
at large; 
3. That it is now an old industry; 
4. That the commerce of the country has great-
ly intensified; 
5. That great capital is required by the estab-
lishment of railroads ; 
6. That there are a great number of railroads 
in the country; and 
7. That they are large and extensive. 
And hence the necessity for recognition of the co-
operative principle and the fatuity of holding to 
competition as a remedy. And hence the necessity 
for regulatory police and supervisory methods of 
such indu~tries. And hence, if evils and oppression 
hav e occurred (who will say they have not?), can we 
not attribute them to the absence of effective regu-
lation? 
When, however, we speak of the intensifying of 
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industries, commercial relationships, the growing 
complexity of modern life and increase of the volume 
of business, already vast, the mind instantly con-
ceives of vast regulating .agencies and of excessive 
interference and ''paternalism.'' 
And if this commercialism and complexity con-
tinues to increase, this fea.r would be well founded. 
But how about the commercialism, etc., ivithoid the 
regulation? Is it not to be feared more? 
'' The plainest things are things we do not see.'' 
Probably the hardest lesson for the American peo-
ple to learn is to learn that commercialism ITSELF 
oppresses. 
The regulation which is demanded by an intense-
ly commercialized and individually intensified life 
is simply a war measure-a measure of defense-
something to hold things together while the people 
face about and enter into simpler living and find their 
lives in fields of service. And when they do this 
there will be comparatively few industries to be regu-
lated to any great extent-those only that affect the 
people at large, like railroads, telegraphs, telephones, 
navigation, etc. The ref ore, to the above compara-
tive statements, we add a few more, viz. : 
8. The simpler the article manufactured, however, 
(a) The less special is the skill required in its 
manufacture, and 
(b) The less the necessity for centralization in 
its manufacture. 
9. The simpler the habits and methods of living 
in a people, 
(a) The fewer their wants. 
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(b) The smaller their manufacturing interests. 
( o) The simpler their industrial system. 
(d) The less strain upon public regulation and 
regulating bodies, 
( e) The more effective will be the regulation 
of such industries as are necessary to be regu-
lated, more time being left therefor. 
(f) The more time will the people have for the 
urgent militant work and offices of the indi-
vidual and the nation for others. 
10. The greater the internal evils of the nation, 
(a) The greater the necessity for co-operation 
in combating them. 
(b) The greater the necessity for recognizing 
the co-operative principle, and, of course, 
( o) The more serious the blow to public weal 
by denying such principle. 
11. The more the nation and its people become 
militant for the good and amelioration of other na-
tions and peoples, 
(a) . The more will the co-operative principle be 
used 
First-To prevent waste in the repetition of 
one man's work by another; and 
Second-To give more effective work through 
unity of action. 
A Vision. 
A land highly cultivated and productive, a land of 
homes with gardens and fields, a land of strong men 
and faithful women, living simple and rugged lives, 
toiling daily, striving constantly, resting regularly, 
grand in character, large-souled, throbbing in spirit, 
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acting upon its faith, co-operating for good, ''work-
ing together with God." 
Its erstwhile great cities decentralized, its count-
less thousands rescued from slums of filth and pau-
perism, as well as slums of selfishness and gluttony, 
and restored to normal conditions, its complex '' con-
veniences" abolished, its child-life simple, healthful, 
buoyant and full of hope. 
Its nation"'wide highways centralized and con-
trolled in the interest of economy and convenience, 
its local highways and utilities managed in the inter-
est of and for its communal welfare, extravagance 
banished, efficiency predominant, while home func-
tions are preserved in wholesome priva~y and exer-
cised under tender family care. 
It does not rest upon itself redeemed; it hears 
the Macedonian cry from across the water. Its hear-
alds have long been there preparing the way. Its 
minions are going and coming to and from its labor 
field, bringing the subjects of its care and love to its 
own homes and settlements or sharing their life 
abroad. 
And this land is America-its f everisb rush for 
gold stilled in the calm of home culture; its strug-
gle between brother and brother at an end; compe-
tition for positions of vantage over each other ban-
ished; competition to serve each other intensified. 
America in the peace of a normal life-and its flag 
a symbol of co-operation . . 
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A Retrospect. 
Those were the days (when the Northern Securi-
ties case was pending) of commercialism run mad. 
The struggle for existence on the part of the early 
settlers had been conquered and succeeded by the in-
dustrial development of the county under the ban-
ner of ''enterprise,'' ~nd this banner was still held 
aloft and before the eyes of all-the millionaire-
the multimillionaire, as well as the hard pressed 
laborer. 
'"Success'' was the watchword and was under-
stood to be getting rich, serving well in war, attract-
ing attention through talents or holding office. 
Patriotism was but faintly understood. '' To fight 
and, if need be, die for one's country" in time of 
war, was its interpretation. To live for one's com-
munity in time of peace was to most people a new 
and even curious idea. 
The motives of men in business were supposed to 
be entirely commercialized-to get money at all haz-
ards, stopping only at the point of effectual legal re-
straint. 
* 
Those were, indeed, the days of commercialism run 
mad; of ideals at war with pr ctices: 
Immense fortunes had been accumulated in private 
hands, and for purely private uses! 
Children, not only occasionally but as a rule inher-
ited these large fortunes, and of course were ruined 
by them or their development retarded and their 
lives _dwarf eq.. 
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Men seemed thoroughly dead to any sense of this 
folly, in spite of the uniform object lessons of 
wrecked lives in wealthy people's children. 
It was no disgrace to work simply to accumulate 
money; and a bequest of one's fortune ( above a 
legitimate family competence) to the state, would 
have occasioned public comment as a very liberal 
thing! 
The policy of nations was to build up only their 
own trade, and trade with foreign nations was nur-
tured only to the point that it was beneficial to do-
mestic wealth getting; while in churches everywhere 
was preached the doctrine of sacrifice and was held 
aloft the vision of world unification 1 
This, too, at a time when a nation sometimes lent 
its life blood to give another state independence ! 
Competition, recognized as healthful in the build-
ing up of the early industries of the country, had 
long outlived its general usefulness; and, enshrined 
as a sort of trade idol, was used blindly to retard co-
operation of large interests so necessary to fullest 
development. 
Thus direct waste was committed in the name of 
the public good; so great was the dread of the "pow-
er of wealth. '' 
This fear was the controlling influence which im-
pelled the court in the Northern Securities case to 
attempt by its decree to annul a co-operative ar-
rangem~nt which assured a single definite policy as 
to the management of the two railroads in question 
and which policy had directly permitted the sudden 
and vast increase in oriental trade;-
A decree which in the name of competition con-
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demned co-operation; and which stands out pre-
eminently in the history of decided cases as an act 
in restraint of trade. 
HARRY s. MECARTNEY. 
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